If fetuses are persons, abortion is a public health crisis by Blackshaw, Bruce & Rodger, Daniel
Bioethics. 2021;00:1–8.    |  1wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/bioe
1  | INTRODUC TION
At the time of writing, the world is still in the grip of the COVID- 19 
pandemic. Amidst fears of an exponential spread of the virus, 
hundreds of millions of individuals have been required to en-
dure periods of strict lockdowns restricting their free movement. 
During a lockdown, people in non- essential jobs can only leave 
their residence for very limited reasons such as food, medical 
care, and exercise, and compliance has often been enforced by 
law. Schools have been temporarily closed, and millions of people 
have lost their jobs. Many businesses have been forced to perma-
nently close.
It is widely believed that governments are obliged to protect 
public health, and control of infectious diseases is clearly part of this 
remit. This is at times in tension with individual rights, exemplified by 
lockdown restrictions intended to protect vulnerable populations 
such as the elderly and immunocompromised, and to slow or halt the 
spread of the virus. It may be that the use of vaccines is made 
compulsory in certain contexts to prevent resurgences of the virus, 
again overriding individual autonomy.1
This raises the question of what other public health crises 
might require the abrogation of certain individual rights. With re-
gard to the abortion debate, pro- life advocates commonly argue 
for the immorality of abortion based on the fetus2 possessing the 
same moral status as children and adults— they are persons. 
However, Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist analogy3 purports to 
show that even if fetuses are persons, abortion is nonetheless per-
missible in many instances. She also implies that women should not 
be legally required to continue with pregnancy in these cases. This 
 1For a detailed ethical discussion of compulsory vaccination, see: Giubilini, A. (2019). The 
ethics of vaccination. Palgrave MacMillan.
 2For ease of use, we use the term “fetus” to refer to all stages of development after 
fertilization. Technically, fertilization begins with a zygote, which divides to become a 
blastocyst. From the second to the eighth week after fertilization, it is referred to as an 
embryo, and thereafter until birth, the fetus.
 3Thomson, J. J. (1971). A defense of abortion. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1(1), 47– 66.
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Pro- life advocates commonly argue that fetuses have the moral status of persons, 
and an accompanying right to life, a view most pro- choice advocates deny. A dif-
ficulty for this pro- life position has been Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist analogy, in 
which she argues that even if the fetus is a person, abortion is often permissible be-
cause a pregnant woman is not obliged to continue to offer her body as life support. 
Here, we outline the moral theories underlying public health ethics, and examine 
the COVID- 19 pandemic as an example of public health considerations overriding 
individual rights. We argue that if fetuses are regarded as persons, then abortion is of 
such prevalence in society that it also constitutes a significant public health crisis. We 
show that on public health considerations, we are justified in overriding individual 
rights to bodily autonomy by prohibiting abortion. We conclude that in a society that 
values public health, abortion can only be tolerated if fetuses are not regarded as 
persons.
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severely undermines the pro- life argument predicated on the per-
sonhood of the fetus. While there are cogent replies to Thomson,4 
we do not take a position on her argument here. Instead, we argue 
that irrespective of her argument’s success, if fetuses are persons 
and a society values public health, then the vast scale of abortion 
entails fetuses must be protected from its harm. This implies im-
plementation of an abortion prohibition. It follows that abortion 
can only be tolerated in a society that considers fetuses to be of 
lesser moral value than children and adults, or that does not value 
public health.
2  | PUBLIC HE ALTH ETHIC S
According to Ronald Bayer and Amy L. Fairchild, modern bioethics 
developed with a strong commitment to individual autonomy and 
rights.5 Both they and Nancy Kass attribute this emphasis to the 
context in which bioethics emerged— medical care and human re-
search.6 This is in contrast to public health ethics, which Stephen 
Holland explains is concerned with “protecting and promoting popu-
lation health,”7 not individuals. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that 
bioethical principles are applicable to public health problems.8 In 
fact, Bayer, Fairchild, and Holland suggest that achieving the goals of 
public health ethics may sometimes come at a cost to individual 
rights.
This raises the question of what moral theory underlies public 
health ethics. Given its emphasis on populations rather than individ-
uals, it is unsurprising that many ethicists argue it should be based on 
some form of utilitarianism. For example, Holland states that utilitar-
ianism is “the moral theory at the heart of public health.”9 Julian 
Savulescu, Ingmar Persson, and Dominic Wilkinson argue that utili-
tarianism’s emphasis on our well- being makes it well suited to setting 
public health priorities.10 Bayer and Fairchild claim that utilitarian 
considerations are central to public health policy makers.11 Broadly 
speaking, utility in the public health context equates to population 
health, which Kass translates as reducing target population morbid-
ity and mortality.12 There is, of course, room for individual rights 
within utilitarianism,13 but a sufficiently large increase in population 
health will justify overriding individual rights, although it is not clear 
what this threshold should be.
Fortunately, public health ethics can draw on another import-
ant moral principle from the liberal tradition regarding the health 
of target populations— John Stuart Mill’s harm principle. This 
states that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his 
will, is to prevent harm to others.”14 In the context of public 
health, harm equates to a decrease in population health, equating 
to an increase in morbidity or mortality15. Avoiding a significant 
decrease in population health inflicted by others is therefore the 
primary justification for overriding individual rights in public 
health ethics.
Morbidity and mortality can be further broken down to calcu-
late public health utility. The literature on healthcare priorities is 
relevant here, as it is concerned with allocating limited resources to 
increase public health utility. As Carl Tollef Solberg and Espen 
Gamlund explain, the primary goal of healthcare is to save lives— 
reducing mortality— and this assumes “longevity is valuable and that 
an early death is generally worse than a late death.”16 Similarly, 
Kamm argues that when saving lives in a healthcare context, we 
should consider both the years of life saved and how good those 
years are expected to be.17 Ceteris paribus, public health ethics im-
plies that we should prioritize saving the lives of the young over 
those of the elderly if we cannot save both, as this maximizes utility. 
This can be used to calculate trade- offs between target 
populations— preventing harm to one target population may cause 
harm to another.
3  | PUBLIC HE ALTH AND COVID - 19
The current COVID- 19 pandemic is a striking example of public 
health considerations being used as justification for abrogating 
certain individual rights. It recalls the case of Mary Mallon, also 
known as “Typhoid Mary,” an asymptomatic spreader of typhoid 
fever whose autonomy had to be curtailed in order to protect 
public health. Mary was forcibly quarantined on two separate oc-
casions totaling 26 years.18 In the case of COVID- 19, govern-
 4Greasley, K. (2017). Arguments about abortion: Personhood, morality, and law. Oxford 
University Press.
 5Bayer, R., & Fairchild, A. L. (2004). The genesis of public health ethics. Bioethics, 18(6), 
473– 492.
 6Kass, N. E. (2001). An ethics framework for public health. American Journal of Public 
Health, 91(11), 1776– 1782.
 7Holland, S. (2014). Public health ethics. Polity Press, p. 20.
 8Ibid: 18.
 9Ibid: 56.
 10Savulescu, J., Persson, I., & Wilkinson, D. (2020). Utilitarianism and the pandemic. 
Bioethics, 34(6), 620– 632.
 11Bayer, R., & Fairchild, A. L. (2016). Means, ends and the ethics of fear- based public 
health campaigns. Journal of Medical Ethics, 42(6), 391– 396.
 12Kass, op. cit. note 6.
 13Gibbard, A. (1984). Utilitarianism and human rights. Social Philosophy and Policy, 1(2), 
92– 102.
 14Mill, J. (2011). On liberty (Cambridge Library Collection - Philosophy). Cambridge 
University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO97 81139 149785, p. 22.
 15On an individual basis, it might be thought that Mill’s harm principle implies abortion is 
impermissible if the fetus is a person, and so there is no need to resort to public health 
ethics. However, the same reasoning also implies that the unconscious violinist cannot 
be disconnected— and as we have seen, Thomson’s argument shows that the violinist 
lacks the right to continued life support despite the harm he suffers by being 
disconnected. So, Mill’s harm principle does not prevent disconnection of the violinist or 
the fetus (provided Thomson’s reasoning is accepted).
 16Solberg, C. T., & Gamlund, E. (2016). The badness of death and priorities in health. BMC 
Medical Ethics, 17, 21.
 17Kamm, F. M. (2013). Bioethical prescriptions. Oxford University Press, p. 378.
 18Marineli, F., Tsoucalas, G., Karamanou, M., & Androutsos, G. (2013). Mary Mallon 
(1869- 1938) and the history of typhoid fever. Annals of Gastroenterology, 26(2), 132– 134.
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ments were prompted into action by Imperial College’s 
epidemiological modeling that predicted if left unchecked, the 
virus would result in 40 million deaths worldwide.19 Even moder-
ate interventions such as isolation of cases and quarantine of 
those considered high- risk would still result in 250,000 deaths in 
the United Kingdom and over 1 million in the United States; lock-
downs, however, were predicted to prevent most of these 
deaths.20 Many countries chose to implement stringent lock-
downs for several months, and at the time of writing, some lock-
downs have been reinstated because of resurgences. These 
lockdowns entailed significant incursions on individual liberty 
rights— people could not freely leave their homes and could not 
associate. As a result, millions have lost their jobs, businesses, 
and many are likely to suffer mental health issues.21 These con-
siderable sacrifices of individual rights have been justified by the 
prevention of significant harm to others, primarily their deaths 
from COVID- 19. Lockdowns are thought to slow the spread of the 
virus, reducing infections and preventing hospitals from being 
overwhelmed by rapid increases in the number of critically ill 
patients.
It is worth noting that the population that is by far the most 
vulnerable to COVID- 19 is the elderly, as well as those with certain 
existing morbidities. Their life expectancy is unlikely to exceed an 
additional 20 years. This indicates that in the public health utility 
calculus, saving millions of lives, even if they are of quite limited 
extent, is thought to justify significant incursions of individual 
rights.
It might be thought that infectious diseases are a special case 
for public health concerns abrogating individual rights. It takes a 
single “super- spreader” to infect a significant number of people and 
trigger a major public health crisis.22 Sacrifices made by individuals 
may prevent harms to the health of many others. However, infec-
tious diseases are not the only scenarios where governments may 
override individual human rights to help achieve public health 
goals.
4  | OTHER PUBLIC HE ALTH ISSUES
One example is smoking. It is common for governments to legislate 
bans on smoking in public places, which is a clear infringement on a 
person’s rights. However, the dangers of passive smoking are well 
established, and so such bans can be justified on the basis of third- 
party harm.
Similarly, seat belt laws restrict an individual’s freedom to drive 
unbelted, but because in Western societies so many people drive 
and the evidence shows that wearing a seat belt significantly re-
duces morbidity and mortality,23 mandatory seat belt laws help to 
prevent car drivers from harming others— both their passengers and 
those in other vehicles. Of course, these laws also help to prevent 
adults from harming themselves. However, Holland notes that Mill is 
clear his principle does not allow for state paternalism24— it is re-
stricted to preventing harm to others. Societies do incur significant 
harms (economic and otherwise) when an individual suffers injury, 
disease or death, and if a certain risky behavior is widespread, those 
costs will be very high. Holland states that “it is not obvious that this 
is the kind of third- party harm [Mill] had in mind.”25
5  | HARM VERSUS RIGHTS
A crucial question is determining what restrictions on individual 
rights are justified in preventing a certain level of harm. It is widely 
agreed that smoking restrictions and seat- belt laws are justified as 
they prevent serious injury, illness and death to third parties, but 
these restrictions do not seem particularly onerous. As we have 
noted, the COVID- 19 pandemic has resulted in far more severe 
restrictions to individual liberties, justified by the potential harm 
that could be inflicted on many millions of individuals, namely their 
deaths.
Some general guidelines have been developed for public health 
emergencies such as pandemics, and a widely accepted codification 
can be found in the UN’s Siracusa Principles.26 Measures must be a 
last resort, they must be prescribed by law (rather than being arbi-
trary), the public interest must be compelling, measures must be pro-
portionate to the issue being addressed and finally, they must be 
necessary measures with no less onerous alternatives. The Siracusa 
Principles allow for derogation of rights on the basis of public health 
(“to take measures dealing with a serious threat to the health of the 
population or individual members of the population”27) and for pub-
lic safety (“protection against danger to the safety of persons, to 
 19Walker, P., Whittaker, C., Watson, O., Baguelin, M., Ainslie, K., Bhatia, S., Bhatt, S., 
Boonyasiri, A., Boyd, O., Cattarino, L., Cucunubá, Z., Cuomo- Dannenburg, G., Dighe, A., 
Donnelly, C., Dorigatti, I., van Elsland, S., FitzJohn, R., Flaxman, S., Fu, H., … Ghani, A. 
(2020). Report 12: The global impact of COVID- 19 and strategies for mitigation and 
suppression. Imperial College COVID- 19 Response Team. https://www.imper ial.ac.uk/
mrc- globa l- infec tious - disea se- analy sis/covid - 19/repor t- 12- globa l- impac t- covid - 19/. 
Accessed Apr 26, 2020.
 20Ferguson, N., Laydon, D., Nedjati- Gilani, G., Imai, N., Ainslie, K., Baguelin, M., Bhatia, 
S., Boonyasiri, A., Cucunubá, Z., Cuomo- Dannenburg, G., Dighe, A., Dorigatti, I., Fu, 
H.,Gaythorpe, K., Green, W., Hamlet, A., Hinsley, W., Okell, L., … Ghani, A. (2020). Report 
9: Impact of non- pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to reduce COVID- 19 mortality and 
healthcare demand. Imperial College COVID- 19 Response Team. https://www.imper ial.
ac.uk/mrc- globa l- infec tious - disea se- analy sis/covid - 19/repor t- 9- impac t- of- npis- on- covid - 1. 
Accessed Apr 26, 2020.
 21Pfefferbaum, B., & North, C. S. (2020). Mental health and the Covid- 19 pandemic. New 
England Journal of Medicine, 383(6), 510– 512.
 22Lin, J., Yan, K., Zhang, J., Cai, T., & Zheng, J. (2020). A super- spreader of COVID- 19 in 
Ningbo city in China. Journal of Infection and Public Health, 13(7), 935– 937.
 23Crandall, C. S., Olson, L. M., & Sklar, D. P. (2001). Mortality reduction with air bag and 
seat belt use in head- on passenger car collisions. American Journal of Epidemiology, 
153(3), 219– 224.
 24Holland, op. cit. note 7, p. 106.
 25Ibid.
 26UN Commission on Human Rights. Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and 
Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Annex. 
(1984). UN Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4. https://undocs.org/en/E/CN.4/1985/4
 27Ibid.
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their life or physical integrity”28). They also allow for a “public emer-
gency which threatens the life of the nation.”29
In the public health utility calculus, proportionality clearly is 
linked to the number of lives that are at stake. The more lives that 
are in danger of being harmed, the more significant the incursions 
on individual rights may be— provided there are no alternatives. For 
COVID- 19, most public health authorities have concluded short pe-
riods of lockdown accompanied by longer periods of restrictions on 
social gatherings have been necessary to save lives.
6  | ABORTION AND PUBLIC HE ALTH
Having established that the primary moral theory underlying pub-
lic healthcare ethics is utilitarianism, and that preventing harm to a 
target population in the form of increased morbidity and mortality 
can justify overriding individual rights, let us now consider abor-
tion. In the abortion debate, pro- life proponents argue that abor-
tion is immoral primarily on the basis that fetuses possess the 
same moral status as children and adults— they are considered per-
sons. Of course, this is a controversial position— most philosophers 
believe the moral status of a person requires conscious capacities 
such as self- awareness, desires and rationality, and this excludes 
the fetus.30
However, let us explore the implications of the pro- life view 
with regard to public health ethics. Let us also assume that fetal 
personhood entails legal recognition by the state. If this were the 
case, then in terms of public health, we should be just as con-
cerned for the health of fetuses as other persons, and it would be 
a goal of public health to reduce their morbidity and mortality. Like 
infants and the elderly, fetuses would also be considered a partic-
ularly vulnerable population demographic. Given that there are 
over 50 million abortions worldwide each year,31 resulting in at 
least 50 million deaths of fetuses, this clearly would comprise a 
major public health crisis— annual abortion deaths are roughly 
equivalent to the total number of deaths of infants, children and 
adults from all causes.32
How would this health crisis compare to COVID- 19? The pan-
demic was predicted to cause the deaths of approximately 40 million 
people, and so abortion is of similar gravity in terms of the numbers 
of deaths. However, recall that calculating public health utility re-
quires considering both the years of life saved and how good those 
years are expected to be.33 On both measures, fetuses are harmed 
far more than the average COVID- 19 victim. Fetuses typically have 
an entire lifetime ahead of them, while the mortality rate for those 
with COVID- 19 increases steeply for those over 60 years of age.34 
The typical fatality had perhaps 20 years of life remaining, and usu-
ally suffered from pre- existing medical conditions. By contrast, fe-
tuses have their entire life expectancy ahead; global average life 
expectancy at birth was 72 years in 2016.35 This implies that if fe-
tuses were legally recognized as persons by the state, abortion 
would have to be considered a far more significant public health cri-
sis than the COVID- 19 pandemic in terms of the harm fetuses suffer 
by being killed. It would justify drastic action to protect this huge and 
very vulnerable population.
7  | PROTEC TING FETUSES
How drastic might the measures taken to protect fetuses be? 
Because abortion maximally harms millions of fetuses, Mill’s harm 
principle justifies the abrogation of individual rights for their protec-
tion should this be necessary. Abortion also satisfies the Siracusa 
Principles’ public health and public safety criteria, permitting dero-
gation of rights if required. Whatever measures are taken, the re-
quirement is that the number of abortions be reduced to the extent 
that abortion is no longer a public health crisis. As a comparison, let 
us consider the leading cause of death for adults— ischemic heart dis-
ease.36 A 90% reduction in abortion numbers would be required to 
bring them to a similar number of deaths.
Significantly reducing abortion numbers would require a dra-
matic change in public behavior towards abortion. Public education 
campaigns could be tried to both discourage abortion and to encour-
age contraceptive use. Governments could also provide generous fi-
nancial incentives and support to pregnant mothers to encourage 
them not to have abortions, and continue to do so once children are 
born to ensure that financial considerations were not an influence on 
their decision. While such approaches may help to reduce abortion 
numbers, it seems unlikely that they will have the dramatic effect 
necessary to deal with such a public health crisis in the short- term. 
An analogy might be dealing with the COVID- 19 pandemic by al-
locating substantial financial support for vaccine research and de-
velopment, and expanding healthcare resources to cope, but doing 
 28Ibid.
 29Ibid.
 30For example, Mary Anne Warren outlines five criteria for personhood, including “the 
presence of self- concepts, and self- awareness.” Warren, M. A. (1973). On the moral and 
legal status of abortion. Monist, 57(1), 43– 61. Jeff McMahan requires that persons 
possess certain psychological capacities. McMahan, J. (2003). The ethics of killing: 
Problems at the margins of life. Oxford University Press, p. 242. Alberto Giubilini and 
Frances Minerva state that a person must be capable of attributing value to their own 
existence. Giubilini, A., & Minerva, F. (2013). After- birth abortion: Why should the baby 
live? Journal of Medical Ethics, 39(5), 261– 263. p. 262.
 31World Health Organization. (2019). Preventing unsafe abortion. https://www.who.int/
news- room/fact- sheet s/detai l/preve nting - unsaf e- abortion. Accessed Apr 27, 2020.
 32World Health Organization. (2017). Global health estimates 2016: Estimated deaths by 
age, sex, and cause. http://www.who.int/healt hinfo/ global_burden_disea se/GHE20 
16_Deaths_Global_2000_2016.xls. Accessed Jul 29, 2020.
 33Kamm, op. cit. note 17, p. 378.
 34Promislow, D. E. L. (2020). A geroscience perspective on COVID- 19 mortality. The 
Journals of Gerontology: Series A, 75(9), e30– e33.
 35World Health Organization. (2018). Life expectancy and healthy life expectancy. Data by 
WHO region. https://apps.who.int/gho/data/view.main.SDG20 16LEX REGv?lang=en. 
Accessed Apr 26, 2020.
 36World Health Organization. (2020). The top 10 causes of death. https://www.who.int/
data/gho/data/theme s/topic s/cause s- of- death/ GHO/cause s- of- death. Accessed Mar 27, 
2021.
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little to prevent the immediate spread of the virus during the interim 
period before a vaccine is developed.
Complicating prevention strategies is Christine Overall’s conten-
tion that the primary reason pregnant women seek abortions is that 
they do not want a child of theirs to exist that they have responsibil-
ity for— they do not want to reproduce.37 For such women, financial 
incentives to continue with pregnancy seem unlikely to be persua-
sive, and so the only measure likely to dramatically reduce the num-
ber of abortions would be prohibition. This would meet the Siracusa 
criteria— prohibition is certainly proportionate to the gravity of the 
issue, and there are no alternatives that are likely to have an appro-
priate impact. Finally, changing the law to prohibit abortions ensures 
this is not an arbitrary measure.
So, on the pro- life view that fetuses have the moral status of per-
sons, it seems that public health considerations justify prohibiting 
abortion. There are, however, a number of objections that could be 
raised against our contention, and we examine them now.
8  | PROHIBITION FAIL S OBJEC TION
It has been claimed that abortion restrictions do not reduce the 
number of abortions.38 However, evidence against this is accumulat-
ing. For example, a recent comparison of state abortion policies in 
the United States has shown that restrictive abortion laws result in a 
significantly lower abortion rate.39 It showed states that have highly 
restrictive laws have 17% fewer abortions than the median rate, 
which if applied globally could potentially save millions of lives each 
year. In addition, if the results of recent liberalization of abortion 
laws are examined, it is clear that this results in significantly more 
abortions being performed. For example, the Republic of Ireland re-
cently legalized abortion, and overall, the number of abortions has 
doubled since the law was changed.40 This includes the many Irish 
women who previously travelled to England or Wales for an abor-
tion. If abortion had also been prohibited in these countries, 
abortion numbers would have been even lower prior to legalization 
in Ireland.
9  | ILLEGAL ABORTIONS OBJEC TION
A second objection is that if abortion is prohibited, some women 
might seek illegal “back street” abortions that could result in their 
being severely injured, perhaps losing their lives. Additionally, ma-
ternal mortality could increase due to more births.
The evidence for increased maternal mortality under stricter 
abortion laws is mixed. Unsafe abortion has been described as a 
“preventable pandemic,” costing 68,000 lives per year worldwide, 
and is claimed to be highest in countries with legal restrictions on 
abortion.41 However, when Chile banned abortions in 1989, this did 
not result in increased overall maternal mortality.42 Poland has some 
of the most restrictive abortion legislation in the world and yet 
shares the lowest maternal mortality rates with Greece, Finland, and 
Iceland at around 3 deaths per 100,000 births.43
For the sake of argument (and to assume the worst case), let us 
assume that stricter abortion laws do make a difference to maternal 
mortality. The ratio for unsafe abortion mortality in countries with re-
strictive abortion laws is claimed to be 34 deaths per 100,000 births.44 
Let us further assume that if abortion were to be restricted worldwide, 
this ratio would be ubiquitous. On the pro- life view that fetuses have 
the same moral value as pregnant women, we must compare this fig-
ure to abortion deaths per 100,000 live births. Gilda Sedgh et al. esti-
mate that worldwide there were 56 million abortions annually 
worldwide during 2010– 2014.45 According to the United Nations, 
there were roughly 82 million births during 2014.46 This translates to 
roughly 68,000 fetal deaths by abortion per 100,000 births— about 
2,000 times higher than our unsafe abortion deaths estimate. Clearly, 
if we treat fetuses as equal to us in moral status, and if restrictions can 
reduce abortion rates significantly as we suggest above, in terms of 
public health utility the case for prohibition is overwhelming.
10  | K ANTIAN OBJEC TION
The Kantian objection to abortion prohibition is based on Kant’s sec-
ond formulation of his categorical imperative, which requires that 
 37Overall, C. (2015). Rethinking abortion, ectogenesis, and fetal death. Journal of Social 
Philosophy, 46, 126– 140.
 38For example: Sedgh, G., Bearak, J., Singh, S., Bankole, A., Popinchalk, A., Ganatra, B., 
Rossier, C., Gerdts, C., Tunçalp, Ö., Johnson, B., Jr, Johnston, H., & Alkema, L. (2016). 
Abortion incidence between 1990 and 2014: Global, regional, and subregional levels and 
trends. The Lancet, 388(10041), 258– 267.
 39Brown, B. P., Hebert, L. E., Gilliam, M., & Kaestner, R. (2020). Association of highly 
restrictive state abortion policies with abortion rates, 2000- 2014. JAMA Network Open, 
3(11), e2024610. https://doi.org/10.1001/jaman etwor kopen.2020.24610
 40There were 32 abortions in the Republic of Ireland during 2018. See Department of 
Health. (2019). Fifth Annual Report on the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 
2013. https://www.gov.ie/en/publi catio n/d6567 3- fifth - annua l- repor t- on- the- prote ction 
- of- life- durin g- pregn ancy- act- 2/. Accessed Mar, 27 2021. According to the First Health 
(Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act 2018 - Annual Report on Notifications, 
there were 6,666 abortions during 2019. https://www.gov.ie/en/publi catio n/b410b 
- healt h- regul ation - of- termi natio n- of- pregn ancy- act- 2018- annua l- repor t- on- notif icati 
ons- 2019/. Accessed Mar 27. 2021. During 2016, the last year figures are available, 3,265 
Irish residents travelled to England and Wales for abortions. See Department of Health 
and Social Care. (2017). Abortion statistics, England and Wales: 2016. https://www.gov.uk/
gover nment/ stati stics/ repor t- on- abort ion- stati stics - in- engla nd- and- wales - for- 2016. 
Accessed Mar 27, 2021.
 41Grimes, D. A., Benson, J., Singh, S., Romero, M., Ganatra, B., Okonofua, F. E., & Shah, I. 
H. (2006). Unsafe abortion: The preventable pandemic. The Lancet, 368(9550), 
1908– 1919.
 42Koch, E. (2013). Impact of reproductive laws on maternal mortality: The Chilean 
natural experiment. The Linacre Quarterly, 80(2), 151– 160.
 43World Health Organization. (2019). Trends in maternal mortality 2000 to 2017: Estimates 
by WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, World Bank Group and the United Nations Population Division. 
World Health Organization. https://apps.who.int/iris/handl e/10665/ 327595. Accessed 
Mar 27, 2021.
 44Grimes et al., op. cit. note 41.
 45Sedgh et al., op. cit. note 38.
 46United Nations. (2014). Concise report on the world population situation 2014. United 
Nations. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/trends/
concise- report2014.asp. Accessed 27 Mar 2021.
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people are never treated as mere means, but ends in themselves.47 
The claim is that prohibiting abortion treats women merely as incu-
bators or containers for the fetus. Of course, on our hypothetical 
assumption that fetuses are persons, abortion similarly treats fe-
tuses as mere means rather than ends in themselves, and so there 
does not seem to be a decisive objection to abortion prohibition on 
a Kantian basis.
A rejoinder, suggested by Bertha Alvarez Manninen, is that fe-
tuses can never be regarded as Kantian persons as they lack moral 
agency and free will,48 and so the categorical imperative applies only 
to the pregnant woman. The difficulty with this “personification 
principle” as Allen Wood points out, is that it excludes many other 
human beings from humanity, such as infants, small children and 
those with severe cognitive impairments.49 Kyle Blanchette makes a 
similar observation.50 In Wood’s view, we should respect rational na-
ture in Kantian persons, but we should also respect beings that show 
glimpses of rational nature or foreshadow it.51 Wood makes particu-
lar reference to children, claiming that it “would show contempt for 
rational nature to be indifferent to its potentiality in children, and to 
treat children as mere things or as mere means.”52 This argument 
could easily be extended to fetuses, and so comprises a plausible 
reply to Manninen. Consequently, the Kantian objection is 
weakened.
11  | UNWANTED CHILDREN OBJEC TION
An anonymous reviewer raised the issue of abortion prohibitions 
resulting in large numbers of unwanted children. They ask if the 
state is responsible for raising millions of unwanted children, if par-
ents are unwilling to do so. When abortion laws were relaxed in the 
United States in the 1960s and 1970s, there was a marked decline 
in children available for adoption,53 and so it certainly seems pos-
sible that stricter abortion laws would result in an increase. 
However, this would be an increase in children unwanted by their 
parents— it does not entail the state would be required to care for 
them. State care would only be required if the number of children 
available for adoption exceeded demand. In wealthier countries, 
demand exceeds supply and has been driving international adop-
tions in recent years.54
Additionally, Fiona Hilferty and Ilan Katz argue that abortion is 
only one reason for the reduction in children available for 
adoption— improved economic conditions, contraception, delayed 
childbearing, increased infertility, and better welfare have all con-
tributed.55 This shift has occurred both in countries receiving in-
ternational adoptions and those supplying them. It suggests that if 
restrictive abortion laws were introduced, there would not neces-
sarily be an increase in the number of children the state must care 
for. In fact, Lisa Gennetian concludes that “as abortion laws be-
come more restrictive the total number of unwanted births may 
decrease.”56
Finally, from a public health ethics perspective, the primary 
concern is to maximize health utility. Provided public health poli-
cies do so, the later consequences must be dealt with as they arise. 
An analogy might be a pandemic that primarily kills those people 
aged over 60, similar to COVID- 19. Suppose a treatment has been 
developed that saves most people’s lives, but a high proportion of 
those saved require long- term care to return to full health (and due 
to old age, some never do), which is expensive. On a public health 
basis, we are required to prioritize saving lives by administering 
the treatment, despite consequences that might incur inconve-
nience and high costs. Similarly, if we assume the pro- life view that 
fetuses are persons, we are obliged to act to save their lives— we 
cannot hold back amid concerns regarding what might happen if 
too many are saved.
12  | THOMSON AND MOR AL STATUS
We have established that on the pro- life view that fetuses are 
considered persons, there is a compelling case for governments to 
prohibit abortion on public health grounds, and we have explored 
various objections, none of which seems likely to prevail in what 
would be a public health crisis involving over 50 million deaths per 
annum worldwide. But as one anonymous referee notes, even if this 
argument is persuasive, most philosophers do not accept the pro- life 
view of the moral status of fetuses, and so it has no significance for 
them.
It is true that this argument holds no persuasive power for those 
who do not hold that fetuses are persons, but they are not its target. 
Rather, this argument is aimed at Judith Jarvis Thomson’s well- 
known violinist analogy,57 which presents a major challenge to pro- 
life arguments based on the moral status of fetuses.
 47Kant, I. (1785). Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals. Trans. M. Gregor & J. 
Timmermann. Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 45.
 48Manninen, B. A. (2014). A Kantian defense of abortion rights with respect for 
intrauterine life. Diametros, 39, 70– 92.
 49Wood, A., & O'Neill, O. (1998). Kant on duties regarding nonrational nature. Aristotelian 
Society Supplementary Volume, 72(1), 189– 210, p. 198.
 50Blanchette, K. (2020). The differentiation argument: If newborns outrank animals, so 
do fetuses. Bioethics, 35(2), 207– 213.
 51Wood & O'Neill, op. cit. note 49, p. 198.
 52Ibid.
 53Bitler, M., & Zavodny, M. (2002). Did abortion legalization reduce the number of 
unwanted children? Evidence from adoptions. Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive 
Health, 34(1), 25– 33.
 54Hilferty, F., & Katz, I. (2018). Inter- country adoption in Australia: Examining the factors 
that drive the practice and implications for policy reform. Australian Journal of Social 
Issues, 54(1), 76– 90.
 55Ibid.
 56Gennetian, L. A. (1999). The supply of infants relinquished for adoption: Did access to 
abortion make a difference? Economic Inquiry, 37(3), 412– 431.
 57Thomson, op. cit. note 3.
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Thomson’s argument is based on a thought experiment that 
constructs an analogy to pregnancy: a famous unconscious violin-
ist has been attached to your body while you are sleeping by the 
Society of Music Lovers, because you are the only person whose 
blood can help him recover from his kidney ailment. His condition 
requires 9 months of treatment, and if you unplug yourself from 
him, he will die. Intuitively, this seems like an outrageous impo-
sition, and so Thomson argues that no- one is obliged to remain 
plugged in to the violinist.
Thomson concludes that even if the fetus is a person and pos-
sesses a right to life, this does not give the fetus the right to use its 
pregnant mother’s body for life support. In many cases, she is not 
morally obliged to continue to offer support because the sacrifices 
involved are too large. Instead, she can choose to withdraw that sup-
port by having an abortion. Thomson also implies that the law should 
not prevent her from doing so. This is problematic for the pro- life 
position— if abortion is permissible even when the fetus is a person, 
this severely undermines all pro- life arguments predicated on per-
sonhood. Indeed, there has been a concentrated effort over the 
years since Thomson’s argument was published to refute it.58
We need not take a position on the cogency of Thomson’s rea-
soning here. We could even grant for the sake of argument that 
Thomson succeeds in showing that the sacrifices of pregnancy usu-
ally do justify the permissibility of abortion.59 However, if it is main-
tained that the fetus is a person, the prevalence of abortion makes it 
a public health concern, and this moves it into the realm of public 
health ethics. On a utilitarian basis, there is a huge decrease in public 
health utility of the fetus population, based on our calculation that 
there are 68,000 fetal deaths by abortion per 100,000 births. Of 
course, there is also a potential decrease in public health utility if 
abortion is prohibited— a woman may suffer physical and mental 
harms if she has no option but to continue with her pregnancy. 
However, on the pro- life view that fetuses are persons, prohibiting 
abortion clearly prevents an overall large decrease in public health 
utility.
Further, because the decrease in utility of the fetal population 
consists of deliberate, maximal harm to the target population, there 
is a further justification for overriding individual autonomy rights 
to prevent this harm, based on Mill’s harm principle. From a public 
health perspective, then, there are additional moral considerations 
beyond those identified by Thomson that entail a prohibition on 
abortion is required.
This is a significant result for pro- life arguments that rely on the 
personhood of the fetus, as Thomson’s argument has regularly been 
employed to undermine such arguments. We have shown that in a 
society that values public health, abortion can only be legal if the 
fetus is thought to possess a significantly lesser moral status than 
that of children and adults.
13  | MISC ARRIAGE
We have argued that the pro- life view that fetuses are persons en-
tails that abortion is a public health crisis. This raises the issue of 
miscarriage. Numerous philosophers have argued60 that if it is be-
lieved that embryos and fetuses have moral status equivalent to chil-
dren and adults, then miscarriage is a public health crisis that must 
be prioritized. Toby Ord claims that over 60% of pregnancies mis-
carry, implying over 200 million deaths annually, significantly more 
than annual deaths from abortion.61
Ord’s argument is intended to show that pro- life advocates (who 
as we have stated generally do believe fetuses to be persons) are 
hypocritical not to focus their attention on miscarriage rather than 
abortion. In response, pro- life philosophers have pointed out that a 
high percentage of miscarriages are not preventable, and shown that 
induced abortion is the most significant preventable cause of death 
prior to birth.62 They have, however, acknowledged that miscarriage 
is an important issue that deserves more attention from pro- life 
advocates.63
Clearly, on the view that fetuses are persons, if induced abortion 
is a public health crisis that requires quite drastic action in the form 
of abortion prohibitions, it must be agreed that miscarriage is also a 
public health crisis. It is less clear what should be done about mis-
carriage, however. We have noted that many miscarriages are not 
preventable, but in addition, no- one is inflicting deliberate harm on 
miscarried fetuses, unlike induced abortion. This limits the applica-
bility of Mill’s harm principle in terms of overriding individual rights 
in order to protect fetuses from miscarriage.
There is one pertinent application here, however. If Ord and his 
associates succeed in showing miscarriage is a public health crisis 
(assuming fetal personhood), then clearly induced abortion is also a 
public health crisis, being of a similar scale. In effect, the argument 
from miscarriage (intended to undermine the pro- life view), when 
considered from a public health perspective, helps to justify a prohi-
bition on abortion.
14  | CONCLUSION
Pro- life advocates commonly argue that fetuses have the moral 
status of persons, and therefore abortion violates their right to 
life. This view has had to contend with Thomson’s violinist analogy, 
 58For example: Lu, M. (2013). Defusing Thomson's violinist analogy. Human Life Review, 
39(1), 46– 62; Schouten, G. (2017). Fetuses, orphans, and a famous violinist. Social Theory 
and Practice, 43(3), 637– 665.
 59For the record, we do not believe Thomson’s reasoning is successful, but this is of no 
consequence here.
 60Murphy, T. F. (1985). The moral significance of spontaneous abortion. Journal of 
Medical Ethics, 11, 79– 83; Ord, T. (2008). The scourge: Moral implications of natural 
embryo loss. The American Journal of Bioethics, 8(7), 12– 19; Simkulet, W. (2017). Cursed 
lamp: The problem of spontaneous abortion. Journal of Medical Ethics, 43(11), 784– 791; 
Berg, A., (2017). Abortion and miscarriage. Philosophical Studies, 174(5), 1217– 1226.
 61Ord, op. cit. note 60.
 62Blackshaw, B. P., & Rodger, D. (2019). The problem of spontaneous abortion: Is the 
pro- life position morally monstrous? The New Bioethics, 25(2), 103– 120; Colgrove, N. 
(Forthcoming). Miscarriage is not a cause of death: A response to Berg's "Abortion and 
Miscarriage". Journal of Medicine and Philosophy.
 63Hershenov, D. B. (2020). What must pro- lifers believe about the moral status of 
embryos? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 101(2), 186– 202.
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in which she argues that even if fetuses are persons, abortion is 
permissible in many cases. However, we have shown that if fetuses 
are considered to be persons, abortion constitutes a significant 
public health crisis. Consequently, widely accepted public health 
ethical principles justify overriding individual rights to bodily au-
tonomy in order to prevent maximal harm to the population of 
fetuses. We conclude if fetuses are persons, public health consid-
erations require that abortion is prohibited. Abortion can only be 
tolerated in a society that values public health if fetuses are not 
regarded as persons.
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